Binding Promises

 

BINDING PROMISES?

 

I

 

In the autumn of 1962 I was reading law at Oxford. Most days I worked in the Bodleian Law Library, where the silence was broken only by the turning of pages, the scraping of a chair, and the occasional subdued footsteps of someone searching the shelves.

I was Jewish, though not, at that stage of my life, particularly observant. My family was in Tel Aviv, and Israel was part of the landscape of my upbringing in a way that I scarcely thought about. It was there, behind me, as family and history and belonging often are when one is young. At Oxford I was more interested in the law, in ideas, and, increasingly, in a young woman who sat two tables away from me.

I had noticed her before. There were not many women reading law in Oxford in those days, and even fewer who looked as she did. She had dark hair, large brown eyes, and a face that appeared serious until she smiled. That afternoon she was reading with such concentration that I found myself looking in her direction rather more often than could reasonably be attributed to an interest in the books behind her.

Once she looked up and caught me. I returned hurriedly to my Law Report and  assumed that would be the end of it. But things took a different turn.

That evening I went to a meeting of one of the smaller Oxford debating clubs. The subject was the promise made by God to Abraham.

The argument, as I remember it, concerned the claim to Palestine founded upon the biblical promise. This was not an abstract subject for me. I had grown up with the Jewish story. Abraham had been promised the land; the promise had descended through Isaac and Jacob; Jacob had become Israel. Whatever one thought about modern politics, the ancient connection of the Jewish people with the land seemed to me beyond serious dispute.

One of the speakers challenged that comfortable sequence.

“If the promise was made to Abraham and his descendants,” he said, “why do you assume that only the descendants of Isaac can claim it? Ishmael was Abraham’s son too.”

There was some approval around the room.

He continued. Arabs, he said, had traditionally traced their descent through Ishmael. If one intended to rely upon a promise made thousands of years ago as the foundation of a modern claim, one could hardly invoke Abraham while quietly forgetting one of Abraham’s sons.

I raised my hand.

“But that isn’t the whole account,” I said. “The promise doesn’t end with Abraham. It is repeated to Isaac and subsequently to Jacob. The biblical narrative itself identifies the line through which the promise continues.”

“According to whose biblical narrative?” somebody called.

“The text we are discussing.”

“Which is precisely the text upon which the claim depends.”

That produced laughter.

I was preparing to answer when I noticed the girl from the Bodleian sitting on the other side of the room. She had been listening without speaking. Now she raised her hand.

“I wonder whether you are all arguing about the wrong question.”

The room became quiet.

She spoke calmly, without any apparent desire to score a debating point.

“You are arguing about the beneficiaries. Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob. Which son? Which descendants? Which people? But surely there is a question before that.”

“What question?” someone asked.

“What was actually promised?”

“A land,” I said.

She looked at me. “Yes. But what does that mean?”

I was not sure whether she was challenging me or inviting me to continue.

“If God promises Abraham that his descendants will possess a land,” I said, “the meaning seems reasonably clear.”

“To Abraham, perhaps.”

“And to Isaac and Jacob.”

“So you say.”

“So the text says.”

She smiled slightly.

“Very well. Let us suppose that it does. Let us suppose the promise was made exactly as you say. Let us even suppose, for the sake of the argument, that God made it. What follows?”

“That depends upon whether one believes in God,” someone said.

“No,” she replied. “That is exactly my point. Even if you believe the promise was made, you still have to decide what the promise does.”

I was intrigued now.

“What do you mean by ‘does’?” I asked.

“We are law students,” she said. “Suppose a man tells his son, ‘One day this house will be yours.’ Has he transferred the house?”

“No.”

“Suppose he repeats it twenty times?”

“It still is: No.”

“Suppose everybody in the family knows he said it?”

“Still no.”

“And suppose the son tells his own children that the grandfather promised the house to their family?”

There was some laughter.

“You are turning Genesis into conveyancing,” I said.

“No. You are.”

That brought rather more laughter. She waited for it to subside.

“A promise may create an obligation,” she said at long last. “It may create an expectation. It may become sacred to the people who believe in it. It may become part of their identity. But those are not all the same thing.”

“God is not an Oxfordshire landowner,” somebody objected.

“Precisely. Which makes it even stranger to speak as though we were examining a title.”

I looked at her across the room.

“So, what are you saying? That the promise means nothing?”

“No. I am saying almost the opposite. A promise can mean a very great deal without being a deed.”

Her sentence stayed with me. At the time, however, I was less interested in its philosophical implications than in the person who had said it.

After the meeting I waited outside.  She emerged with two other students. When they moved away, I introduced myself.

“Peter.”

“Fausa.”

“You demolished my argument.”

“I thought I improved it.”

“Then perhaps I owe you coffee.”

“For improving your argument?”

“For preventing me from making it again.”

She considered this and finally said: “That might require more than one coffee.”

And so it began.

II

After that we saw one another frequently. Oxford assisted us. There were walks beside the river, inexpensive meals, concerts when we could afford them and coffee when we could not. We talked for hours. About law at first, because law had given us permission to talk. Then about books, politics, religion, our families and the lives we imagined we would have when Oxford was finished.

Fausa was Egyptian and Muslim. I, as already mentioned, was Jewish and Israeli. Stated like that, the difference sounds formidable. At Oxford it did not always feel so. Perhaps that was one of Oxford’s illusions. Everyone seemed to have arrived from somewhere else. Nationality, religion and family history could be discussed over coffee and then temporarily left behind when one walked out into the cold.

Fausa was curious about Judaism. I was curious about Islam. Neither of us was inclined to preach to the other. We did, however, argue. And she kept  teasing me about my defence of Abraham’s promise.

“You still think it was a deed,” she said once.

“I never said it was a deed.”

“You argued like a conveyancer.”

“I was establishing succession.”

“To property which you now admit had never been conveyed.”

“I admit nothing.”

She laughed. And I discovered that I liked making her laugh.

There was no moment when either of us announced that we had fallen in love. Friendship simply ceased to be an adequate description. We began to make plans in the careless manner of young people who believe that identifying an obstacle is much the same thing as overcoming it.

“Where would we live?” she asked one day.

“Anywhere.”

“Anywhere isn’t a country, Peter.”

“England, then.”

“And if England doesn’t want us?”

“France.”

“Why France?”

“Because you rejected anywhere.”

She laughed, but the question did not disappear.  She knew, more clearly than I did, that our families and backgrounds travelled with us even when they were hundreds or thousands of miles away.

“Would your family in Tel Aviv  accept me?”

“Eventually.”

“Eventually is a dangerous word.”

“And yours in Egypt, would they accept me?”

She gave me a look.

“All right,” I persevered. “We shall disappoint both families equally.”

“You make everything sound simple.”

“It usually is until people make it complicated.”

“No,” she said. “Sometimes things are complicated before people begin.”

I did not understand then how characteristic that difference was between us. I believed difficulties were problems to be solved. Fausa understood that some difficulties were conditions under which one had to live.

Still, for the moment, it did not matter.  We were young. We were in Oxford. And we were together.

 

III

A journey to Paris seemed at first no more than an adventure. Fausa’s sister joined us, as did a Korean student she had met in Oxford. He was an agreeable young man, courteous and amusing, and the four of us made an unlikely travelling party: two Egyptian sisters, a Korean and an Israeli Jew crossing the Channel together as though Europe had been constructed for our convenience.

In Paris we stayed at the Montefiore Home. Whatever freedoms Oxford had encouraged in us, there were still proprieties to be observed. Fausa and her sister shared one room. The Korean and I shared another.

I remember our arrival: bags deposited, coats thrown across beds, the excitement of being in Paris with several days ahead of us and very little money with which to enjoy them.

The Montefiore Home had Israeli residents, and almost immediately I found myself talking to them.

It happened naturally. I heard Hebrew. Someone discovered that I was from Tel Aviv. Within minutes there were questions.

Where was my family?

What was I doing at Oxford?

How long had I been away?

Did I know this person, that street, that café?

There is an intimacy in hearing one’s own language in a foreign city. I slipped into Hebrew without thinking. Jokes required no explanation. References to home needed no footnotes. For a little while Paris disappeared and I might have been among acquaintances in Tel Aviv.

When I looked across the room, Fausa was watching me. She raised her eyebrows. It was a tiny gesture. I knew it well enough by then to understand that it contained an entire observation.

Later she said, “You made friends quickly.”

“They’re Israelis.”

“I noticed.”

“I’ve never met them before.”

“I know.”

“Then why are you looking at me like that?”

“Like what?”

“You know perfectly well.”

She smiled. “I merely find it interesting.”

“What is interesting?”

“How quickly strangers stop being strangers.”

I thought she was teasing me.

“They’re not entirely strangers. We have things in common.”

“Yes,” she said. “I can see that.”

There was nothing hostile in her voice. If anything, she sounded thoughtful.

That evening Fausa and her sister had arranged to meet some Egyptian friends in Paris. The Korean student was to go with them.

“You’ll come?” Fausa asked me.

I hesitated. I had been talking to the Israelis. Someone had suggested going out later. Another had begun telling me about a mutual acquaintance. The conversation had the easy momentum of home.

“I think I’ll stay here tonight.”

She looked at me. “With your new friends?”

“They’re hardly my new friends.”

“Of course not.”

There were those raised eyebrows again.

“You go,” I said. “You haven’t seen your Egyptian friends for ages.”

“And you haven’t seen these Israelis ever.”

“That is a lawyer’s argument.”

“I learned from you.”

Her sister was waiting. So was the Korean. Fausa put on her coat. For a moment I thought she was going to say something more. But she did not.

The three of them went out together. I remained at the Montefiore Home with the Israelis. At the time, I attached no importance to the choice. Looking back, I think Fausa did.

IV

 

When we returned to Oxford, Paris receded surprisingly quickly. There were lectures to attend, books to read and examinations, in one form or another, waiting for both of us. Oxford had a way of absorbing whatever had happened elsewhere.

Fausa and I continued much as before. We met for coffee, walked when the weather permitted and when it did not, and argued about matters which seemed important at the time and others which probably were. If Paris had altered something between us, I did not notice it.

My own work was going well. I was making progress with my doctorate and had begun to think seriously about what would follow it. An academic career seemed possible. There might be a post in England or, if not England, somewhere in the Commonwealth. Universities needed lawyers, and I had the confidence of a young man who had not yet been given sufficient reason to doubt that the world would eventually find a place for him.

Fausa, meanwhile, completed her B.A. in Law with flying colours. Somerville was proud of her, and rightly so. She had always been an excellent student, disciplined where I was inclined to improvise and unwilling to accept an argument merely because it had been confidently expressed.

The future therefore seemed remarkably accommodating. There was my doctorate. There was her degree. There would be a university somewhere, a house of some description and, in due course, the rest of our lives.

I could see no serious obstacle. Fausa could.

 

V

She raised the matter one evening when we were walking to Carfax.

“Peter, do you ever think about Paris?”

“Frequently. Particularly the food we couldn’t afford.”

“I don’t mean the food.”

I knew then what she meant, although I pretended not to.

“What about Paris?”

“The Montefiore Home.”

“What about it?”

“You with the Israelis. Me with the Egyptians.”

“We were in Paris. One is allowed to meet people.”

“That isn’t what I mean.”

We walked a little further.

“At Oxford,” she said, “we have learned to be very tolerant.”

“You make that sound like a criticism.”

“It isn’t. But Oxford is a rather special place.”

“That is generally what Oxonians  think.”

She ignored this.

“We can talk about Judaism and Islam. Israel and Egypt. Your family and mine. We can disagree and then go for coffee.”

“We have been doing it quite successfully.”

“Yes. Here.”

I stopped walking.

“What difference does that make?”

“A great deal, perhaps.”

She reminded me of Paris. I had met a group of Israelis whom I had never seen before and within minutes had been speaking Hebrew and behaving as though I had known them for years. She had gone to meet Egyptians and had felt equally at home among them.

“That proves nothing,” I said.

“I think it proves a great deal.”

“What?”

“That these things are deeper in us than we pretend.”

“I have never pretended not to be Israeli.”

“No. Nor have I pretended not to be Egyptian. That is precisely the difficulty.”

I told her that people were not prisoners of their backgrounds.

“I know.”

“We choose how we live.”

“Yes.”

“Then what are we arguing about?”

She looked at me for a moment.

“Whether choosing is always enough.”

I tried to dismiss the question. We loved one another. We had already crossed the supposedly formidable boundaries of nationality and religion. Our families might object. They would eventually become accustomed to the idea. We would live in England, perhaps, or somewhere else where neither background need dominate.

“You still believe in ‘anywhere’,” she said.

“It has improved. I now have the Commonwealth.”

She smiled, but only briefly.  Then she raised the question I had not considered.

“What about children?”

I confess that my first reaction was relief. Children seemed a distant and therefore manageable problem.

“What about them?”

“What would they be?”

“Ours, I hope.”

“Peter.”

“All right. What do you mean?”

“You know what I mean. Jewish? Muslim? Israeli? Egyptian?”

“Whatever they wanted to be.”

She shook her head firmly: “That is not an answer!”

“Why not? We would bring them up to think for themselves.”

“Children do not begin by thinking for themselves. They ask their parents.”

“Then we would explain both.”

“And when they ask which one is true?”

“We would tell them they must decide.”

“At six?”

“Not at six.”

“At ten? Fifteen? Twenty? When are they old enough to discover that their parents could never answer the question themselves?”

I told her she was making difficulties where none  existed.

“No,” she said quietly. “You always think that.”

I remembered another conversation. Sometimes things are complicated before people begin. I had not understood her then. I was beginning to.

“We love each other,” I said.

“Yes.”

“That must count for something.”

“It counts for a great deal.”

“Then surely it counts for more than this.”

She was silent.

I took her hand.

“We have promised each other, Fausa.”

That produced the faintest smile.

“Promised?”

“Yes.”

“Everlasting love?”

“If you like.”

“And everlasting agreement?”

“I didn’t say agreement.”

“Everlasting cohesion, then.”

“That sounds like a treaty.”

“We are lawyers.”

I laughed. She did not.

Then she said, “Do you remember the first evening we spoke?”

“Of course.”

“Abraham?”

“I had hoped eventually to be forgiven for Abraham.”

“You, Peter, said the promise continued through Isaac and Jacob.”

“And you turned Genesis into conveyancing.”

“No. You did.”

For a moment we were back in the debating room.

Then she said, “You believed a promise could bind people thousands of years after it was made.”

“I was younger then.”

“You are not very old now.”

“What has Abraham to do with us?”

“Perhaps more than we thought.”

I waited.

“We have made promises too,” she said. “And we meant them. I do not doubt that.”

“Then—”

“But meaning a promise does not make everything which follows from it possible.”

I said nothing.

“A promise can be sacred,” she continued. “It can become part of who you are. But that does not mean it can settle every claim which comes afterwards.”

The argument was familiar. Only the parties had changed.

“So, our promise means nothing?”

She looked at me. “It means a very great deal.”

I knew the rest before she said it.

“But it is not a deed.”

We walked on.

I argued, of course. I told her that we were surrendering to difficulties which had not yet occurred. That families could change. Countries could change. We could change. Children who did not yet exist were hardly entitled to determine the lives of two people who did.

She listened. Then she said something which finally defeated me.

“If we are wrong now, Peter, we hurt each other. If we are wrong later, we may hurt them as well.”

There was no answer which did not sound like another promise.

She thought it better that we separate while we could still do so without bitterness. Otherwise, she said, pride might keep us together long after the things we had put aside at Oxford had returned to claim us.

Initially, I did not agree. Then, downcast, I did.

There was no dramatic farewell. No accusation. Neither of us had betrayed the other. That would almost have been easier.

We had simply reached a point at which Fausa could see further down the road than I could. So, we parted. For a long time afterwards I thought that we had broken a promise.

Much later, I wondered whether Fausa had understood from the beginning what she had tried to tell me on the first evening we met. A promise may bind the people who make it. It cannot always bind the future.

 

 

VI

 

More than fifty years have passed since Fausa brought our romance to an end.

Not long afterwards I left Oxford and began what became a long academic career. I held Chairs of Law in Wellington, then at Monash in Melbourne, and eventually settled in Singapore in 1986. There were students to teach, books and articles to write, universities to serve and, in due course, a family of my own. Life has a way of occupying the time one might otherwise spend examining the roads not taken.

In 2013 I finally retired. By then I had lost my wife and was living alone on Singapore’s East Coast. Perhaps retirement leaves too much room for memory. In any event, after all those years, I found myself thinking again about Fausa.

I had no idea what had become of her. I hoped that, after her excellent B.A. in Law, she had gone on to read for the prestigious Oxford B.C.L. She certainly had the ability for it. I also hoped that she had enjoyed a distinguished career, that she had married happily and had the family whose future she had been wise enough to think about when I was not. Above all, I hoped that life had treated her well.

I sometimes returned in my mind to that first evening in Oxford, when we argued about the promise made to Abraham. Fausa had insisted that a promise might mean a very great deal without being a deed. More than half a century later, I think I understand her argument rather better than I did then.

And yet, with the advantage — or perhaps the distortion — of old age, I sometimes wonder whether Fausa erred on the side of caution. In the years since, I have known many marriages between people of different religions, nationalities and backgrounds, whose children appear to have suffered no handicap from inheriting more than one tradition. Perhaps the difficulties she foresaw were real without being insuperable. There is no way now of knowing.

Further, when we were together, Egypt and Israel were still in a state of war. Peace between our countries came only in 1979. Had it come while we were at Oxford, might Fausa have felt differently about our future?

In the  end, the promises Fausa and I made to one another did not bind us to the future we had imagined. Perhaps no promise could have done that. But I do not think they therefore meant nothing. We made them sincerely, and for a time they bound two young people who believed that love might be sufficient to overcome history, religion, family and everything else the future might place in their way. Were we actually wrong?

Whether the ancient promise to Abraham can bind his descendants thousands of years later is a question for theologians, lawyers and perhaps politicians. Fausa and I were, in our different ways, among those descendants, and we too made promises about a future we could not command. Ours did not give us the life together that we had imagined. Yet I cannot say that they came to nothing. After more than fifty years, they bind me still – not to what might have been, but to the hope that Fausa had a long and happy life.

 

 

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